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Abstract  
Purpose: This study empirically tests the validity of the free cash 
flow hypothesis among firms quoted on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange (NSE) from 2007 to 2017. 
Research methodology: The study employed a dynamic panel 
system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) in analyzing the 
data generated.  
Results: the result failed to provide empirical evidence in support 
of the Jensen free cash flow hypothesis in Nigeria. The equally 
showed that a high concentration of shareholding in the hand of a 
few individual increases the amount of dividend paid out to 
shareholders. The result is however robust using different methods.   
Limitations: We focused only on testing the validity of the free 
cash flow hypothesis proposed by Jensen (1986).  
Contribution: The study provided empirical evidence that 
invalidates the propositions of the free cash flow hypothesis 
among publicly quoted firms in Nigeria. The result is robust using 
different estimation techniques.   
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1. Introduction 
The concept of free cash flow has gained increasing attention in corporate finance literature following 
the work of Jensen (1986) which brought the Free Cash Flow (FCF) hypothesis to the limelight. The 
Jensen free cash flow hypothesis presupposes that management of firms with increasing FCF's tends 
to invest in a project with negative Net Present Value (NPV) to enrich themselves at the expense of 
the owners of the firm. According to Kadioglu and Yilmaz (2017) managers of firms employ free cash 
flow as a tool to promote their selfish interests at the detriment of the shareholders. And so, as the free 
cash flow increases in the firm, the agency cost increases proportionately due to conflict of interest 
between managers and shareholders (Zhang et al, 2016). Yeo (2018) however, noted that firm 
managers have incentive to invest instead of distribution to the shareholders even when the 
investment produces a negative NPV. We focused only on testing the validity of the free cash flow 
hypothesis proposed by Jensen (1986). 
 
It is based on the forgoing that the free cash flow hypothesis asserts that managers with increased FCF 
will prefer to invest in negative NPV projects rather than distributing the FCF as dividends to the 
shareholders. Managers with FCF will deliberately avoid debt financing and dividend payout as these 
options will reduce the FCF under their control and move will increase the agency problem faced by 
the firm. Several studies have been conducted in different economies of the world examining the 
effect of free cash flow on dividend payout policy of publicly quoted firms, but different conclusions 
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reached. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2000), Kadioglu and Yilmaz (2017), La Porta, Loper-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (2000) provided empirical evidence supporting the free cash flow hypothesis in 
their various studies. On the other hand Byrd (2010), Khan, Kaleem, and Nazir (2012), and Zhang 
(2009) concluded in their studies that debt financing reduces free cash flow in the hand of the 
management as they are under obligation to settle their outstanding indebtedness. While Titman, Wei, 
and Xie (2004) and Fairfield, Whisenant, and Yohn (2003) reported that firms with free cash flow 
make extreme investments hence leading to the poor performance of the firm.  
 
Despite what may seem like an avalanche of research work in this subject area in other jurisdiction of 
the world, no study to the best of our knowledge has tested the validity of free cash flow hypothesis in 
Nigeria or investigated the effect of free cash flow on dividend payout of firms quoted on the Nigerian 
stock exchange. We could not also find any study that examined the interaction effect of free cash 
flow with ownership concentration and board ownership on dividend payout of firms in Nigeria. 
 
This study, therefore, examines the validity of the free cash flow hypothesis among firms publicly 
quoted on the Nigerian stock exchange using a sample of 65 firms for the period of 2007 to 2017. A 
panel dynamic Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) was used to establish the effect of free cash 
flow on dividend payout of the sampled firms in Nigeria for the period under investigation. The rest 
of the study is structured as follows: section two of the study provides a review of relevant literature, 
section three presents the data and methodology for the study while, section four presents the result 
and the interpretation of the analysis. Finally, we present the conclusion and policy recommendations 
in section five of the study. 
 
2. Literature review  
2.1 Theoretical review 
2.1.1 Free cash flow hypothesis  
The free cash flow hypothesis, according to Jensen & Meckling (1976) posits that managers tend not 
to behave in a way consistent with the profit maximization objective of the firm. They noted that 
Managers most often use increased free cash flow to pursue objectives that have little or no effect on 
profit growth. In line with the free cash flow postulations, the agency cost explanation introduced by 
Jensen, Clifford & Smith (1995), suggests that monitoring difficulty creates the potential for 
management to spend internally generated cash flow on projects that are beneficial from a 
management perspective but costly from a shareholder perspective. It, therefore, suggests that 
investments in profitable projects decrease the amount of free cash flow available for them to pursue 
their opportunistic consumption and suboptimal investments. 
 
Donaldson (1990), argues that managers of firms with free cash flows (cash flows above profitable 
investment opportunities) tend to waste cash by taking excessive perquisites or by making 
unprofitable investments. Similarly, Managers who control free cash flows are more likely to invest in 
projects that will merely increase the size of the firm (or pay themselves excessive perks), instead of 
paying dividends to the owners of the firm or repurchase outstanding shares to increase the market 
value of the share. A contestable inference drawn by the agency hypothesis is that firms that possess 
free cash flows are more probable to grow over the optimal point of shareholder wealth maximization. 
The firm's Shareholder tends to benefit from the decision of the management that helps in preventing 
these wasteful expenditures. One of the ways to prevent such waste is through Share repurchases, 
which use up the excess cash flows available within the firm (Jensen & Smith, 1995).  
 
Similarly, the reaction of the capital market to a drop in dividend payout is a sharp decline in the stock 
price of the firm's stock this, however, is consistent with the agency costs of free cash flow. 
Meanwhile, when Debt is created, without retaining the proceeds arising from the issue, it enables 
managers of a firm to effectively keep their promise to pay out future cash flows. And so, one key 
instrument that provides an effective substitute for dividends is debt, although something is not 
generally recognized in the corporate finance literature. The issuance of debt as a substitute for stock, 
bond managers to their promise to pay out future cash flows in a manner that cannot be accomplished 
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by simple dividend increases. This, however, empowers the debt holders with the right to initiate 
bankruptcy proceedings against the firm in the court of law if they do not keep their promise to make 
the interest and principal payments as when due to the debt holders (Jensen & Michael, 1976). 
 
2.2 Empirical review 
Nguyen et al (2014) in their study tested the free cash flow theory and its effect on dividend policy of 
firms quoted on the Vietnams Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2012 and their result showed that the 
firm's dividend policy is consistent with the theory of free cash flow. This, however, implies that the 
company that pays a dividend higher than the industry average of 47.36% has the largest free cash 
flow. They further suggest that the firms that pay a dividend or higher dividend are mainly small firms 
which the authors noted that they do so to prevent the stock price from declining. This result led the 
authors to question the rationale for dividend payment by smaller firms, whether they just pay a 
dividend to meet the needs of the investors even if there are investment opportunities that can 
generate a positive Net Present Value for the firm.  
 
Wang (2010) investigated the extent to which free cash flow is associated with agency cost and how 
free cash flow and agency cost influence firm performance in Taiwan. Employing data from Taiwan 
publicly quoted companies the result showed that free cash flow has a significant impact on agency 
cost with two contrary effects. On one hand, he opined that free cash flow could incur agency cost due 
to perquisite consumption and shirking behavior; on the other hand, the generation of free cash flow, 
resulting from internal operating efficiency, could lead to better firm performance. Conversely, the 
result provides evidence of a positive and significant relationship between free cash flow and firm 
performance measures, demonstrating a lack of evidence supporting the free cash flow hypothesis. 
 
Cai (2013) is a study that theoretically and empirically examined the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm-level over-investment of free cash flow, employing a cross-sectional paired 
sample of 1411 firms, annual observation of listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchange in China covering the period of 2003 up to 2010. The result showed that there is a 
significant positive association between over-investment and free cash flow. 
 
Hejazi and Moshtaghin (2014) in their study examined the impact of agency cost of free cash flow on 
the dividend policy and leverage firms in Iran. The study employed data generated from 101 
companies listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange from 2007 to 2012. They adopted the multivariate 
linear regression model by using panel fixed effect approach in the analysis of the data generated. 
Their result indicates that there is a positive and significant effect that the agency cost of free cash 
flow has on the dividend and leverage policy of the firms under study. Furthermore, firm size and 
profitability were shown to exert a positive and significant effect on the dividend policy of the firms 
quoted on the Tehran stock exchange. Kadioglu and Yilmaz (2017) investigated the validity of the 
free cash flow hypothesis among firms traded on Borsa Istanbul, employing a panel dataset of 1267 
observations from 227 companies from 2008 to 2014. Their result provided empirical evidence 
supporting the free cash flow hypothesis.   
 
Yeo (2018) examined the role of free cash flow in making investment and dividend decisions in 
shipping industries, employing generalized least square regression, and the result revealed that free 
cash flow leads to an increase in investment and reduction in dividends among a sample of 137 
shipping firms from 35 countries. Although there is series of studies in Nigeria that examined the 
relationship between dividend policy and other variables like firm performance, share price, life-cycle 
theory, cash flow, and agency conflict among which are, Adelegan (2003), Tijjani & Sani (2016), 
Eniola & Akinselure (2016), Ogundipe et al (2012), Nwidobie (2013), Bingilar & Oyadonghan 
(2014), Inyiama & Nwankwo (2016), Okafor et al (2011). We could not find any study in Nigeria that 
directly tested the validity of the free cash flow hypothesis among firms trading in the Nigerian stock 
exchange. 
 
The following hypothesis were formulated and tested. 
H1: increase in free cash flow negatively affects dividend pay-out of firms in Nigeria. 
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H2: changes in ownership structure do not have any effect on dividend pay-out of firms in Nigeria.  
H3: the interaction of free cash flow and ownership structure has no effect on dividend pay-out of 
firms in Nigeria. 
 
3. Research methodology 
The sample size for this study comprises of 30 dividend firms quoted on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange. The names of the sampled firms are presented in Appendix 1. The sampling technique 
employed in this study is purposive sampling technique. The choice of this technique is to provide 
opportunities for the researcher to isolate and control for some limitations by removing some items 
from the population. According to Awoyemi and Bagga (2016) out of 212 quoted companies in NSE, 
only 124 pay divided representing 58% of all the firms listed on the NSE. Based on the consistency of 
dividend payment within the last five (5) years, they reported that companies that maintain 100% 
dividend payment consistency represents 18% of dividend-paying firms and are mostly large firms. 
Similarly, 6% of dividend-paying firms maintain a dividend payment consistency of about 71-80% 
while 35% of the firms maintain consistency of about 50-70%. The remaining 41% maintain a 
dividend payment consistency of less than 50%. Following the report of Awoyemi and Bagga (2016), 
we arrived at a sample size of 30 dividend-paying firms which maintained 80-100% dividend 
payment consistency within the period under investigation. These companies are presented below. 
The variables of choice comprises of dividend payout which is the dependent variable, free cash flow, 
total assets, board ownership, and ownership concentration which are independent variables. The 
study made use of the undistributed cash flow method to determine the free cash flow. The approach 
is similar to the one used by Kadioglu and Yilmaz (2017), Hong, Shuting, and Meng (2012), and Al-
Zararee and Al-Azzawi (2014). The dependent variable (dividend payout) and the free cash flow were 
normalized using total assets although some studies normalized free cash flow using sale value. The 
model included natural logarithm of total assets as a control variable while the interaction of free cash 
flow and board ownership together with the interaction of free cash flow and ownership concentration 
where all included in the model to determine if the free cash flow hypothesis holds or otherwise given 
the ownership structure of the firm. 
 3.1 Model specification  
The signalling effect theory of dividend states that increase dividend pay-out is a signal that the 
management of the firm is trading favourably with the investors' fund. In other words, it suggests that 
an increase in dividend pay-out by a company is an indication of a positive prospect. Most often than 
none management of the firm uses dividend signalling as an indication of good investment potential. 
Meanwhile, the value of a firm's dividend for the current year often tends to reflect or to a greater 
extent depend on the previous years' value. Implying that, the lagged values of dividend pay-out affect 
the current years' value. To capture this effect, a dynamic panel data model with the lagged value of 
dividend will have to be included as an independent variable will be most appropriate. We, therefore, 
adopted and modified the GMM model developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Bllundel and 
Bond (1998) to suit the current study. And so, to achieve the objectives of this study, we specify five 
(5) different models to address the five hypotheses stated in this work. The level form of the model, as 
well as the first differenced model as proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995), are as follows: 
     
∑ 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑ 𝜑𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ ∅𝑂𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜕𝐹𝐶𝐹 ∗ 𝑂𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜋𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 … … … … … … … . (1) 
 
∑ ∆𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡 =  ∑ 𝜑∆𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽∆𝑓𝑐𝑓𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ ∅∆𝑜𝑤𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝜕∆𝑓𝑐𝑓 ∗ 𝑜𝑤𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿∆𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 … … … … . (2) 
  𝑖 = 1 … … 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1 … … . . 𝑇 
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Where ∆ is the difference operators, ∑ is the summation sign, 𝛽 is the coefficient of free cash flow, 𝜑 
is the coefficient of lagged dividend payout,∅ is the coefficient of ownership concentration, 𝜕 is the 
coefficient of the interaction term, 𝛿 is the coefficient of firm Size,𝜀 is the error term. 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡  is the 
Dividend Payout as a ratio of total assets, 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1 is the Dividend Payout as a ratio of total assets for 
the previous period, 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 is the Free Cash Flow to equity as a ratio of total assets, OWCi,t is the 
Ownership Concentration, FCF*OWCi,t is the Interaction between free cash flow and ownership 
concentration 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the Natural Logarithm of the firm’s Total Assets 
3.2 Techniques of data analysis 
This study examined the effect of free cash flow on the dividend policy of publicly quoted firms in 
Nigeria. We began the estimation procedure by estimating a linear dynamic panel-data (DPD) model 
to capture the effect of lagged dividend pay-out on the current dividend pay-out. DPD models contain 
unobserved panel-level effects that are correlated with the lagged dependent variable, and this renders 
standard estimators inconsistent. The Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator provides 
consistent estimates for such models. This estimator differences the data first and then uses lagged 
values of the endogenous variables as instruments. However, as pointed out by Arellano and Bover 
(1995), lagged levels are often poor instruments for first differences. Blundell and Bond (1998) 
proposed a more efficient estimator, the system GMM, which mitigates the problem of the weak 
instrument by using additional moment conditions. The system GMM uses more instruments than the 
difference GMM, and therefore one might expect the system estimator to be more biased than the 
difference estimator. However, Hayakawa (2007) shows that the bias is smaller for the system than 
the difference GMM. Specifically, the bias of the system GMM estimator is smaller because it is a 
weighted sum of the biases of the difference and the level estimator, and that these biases move in 
opposite directions.  We, therefore, use the more efficient and less biased system GMM estimator for 
our regressions. We now point out some potential caveats of the system GMM estimator and discuss 
how these problems are addressed. The first issue relates to the validity of the instruments.   
Second, the procedure assumes that there is no second-order autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic 
errors. Another pertinent issue is that the test for autocorrelation and the test for the validity of the 
instruments lose power when the number of instruments, I, is large relative to the cross-section sample 
size (in our case, the number of firms), n. specifically, when the instrument ratio, r, defined as𝑟 =𝑖
𝑛, is 
less than 1, the assumptions underlying the two procedures are likely to be violated (Roodman, 2006). 
Furthermore, a low r raises the susceptibility of the estimates to a Type 1 error— i.e., producing 
significant results even though there is no underlying association between the variables involved. The 
easiest solution to this problem is to restrict the number of lags of the dependent variable used for 
instrumentation to the point where r≥1 (Roodman, 2006). 
To address these potential problems, we test for autocorrelation and the validity of instruments for 
each regression. Specifically, for each regression, we report the p-values for the test for second-order 
autocorrelation as well as the Hansen-J test for over-identifying restrictions. We report the results for 
the regressions, and the p-values to indicate whether the assumption of no second-order 
autocorrelation is satisfied in each of the regressions. Furthermore, the instruments are valid in all the 
estimated regressions. Thus, the two assumptions are satisfied in our specifications. Furthermore, in 
all the regressions, r≥1, and therefore we do not restrict the number of lags of the dependent variable 
used for instrumentation. We end the section by providing some details about our estimation strategy. 
First, we use the two-step GMM estimator, which is asymptotically efficient and robust to all kinds of 
heteroskedasticity. Second, the independent variables are treated as strictly exogenous in all the 
regressions. Besides, our regressions utilize only internal instruments—we do not include additional 
(external) instruments. Note that the system estimator uses the first difference of all the exogenous 
variables as standard instruments, and the lags of the endogenous variables to generate the GMM-type 
instruments described in Arellano and Bond (1991). Furthermore, the system estimations include 
lagged differences of the endogenous variables as instruments for the level equation. 
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3.3 Model diagnostics 
One of the problems associated with Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator is the over-
identification of instruments. Since the estimator employs different lags instruments in other to 
eliminate the firm-specific effect, hence given rise to proliferation of instrument. The effect of 
instrument proliferation in the model is that too many instruments can over-fit endogenous variables, 
thereby failing to remove the endogenous components of the variable and as well lead to a biased 
coefficient estimate towards those from un-instrumented estimators. Meanwhile, to solve this 
problem, Arellano and Bond (1991) recommended restrictions in the model through the inclusion of 
collapse command in the GMM estimator. And so, to test form the validity of the restrictions in the 
model, the study employs Hansen and Sargan test of over-identification. Sargan-Hansen tests are the 
test of over-identifying restrictions, which is based on the null hypothesis that the over-identifying 
restrictions are valid. To proceed with the GMM dynamic panel data model, we must fail to reject the 
null hypothesis in both tests.  
Similarly, the choice of GMM in the first place over the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimator is 
due largely to the presence of autocorrelation in the model. This arises due to the inclusion of the 
lagged value of the dependent variable as an explanatory variable. And so, to justify the use of GMM 
there must be autocorrelation of order one (AR(1)) but not more than order one if the result of the 
dynamic GMM estimator is to be free from bias.  The result of the AR(1) test must indicate the 
rejection of the null hypothesis which states there is no autocorrelation in the model and accept the 
alternative hypothesis of autocorrelation in the model. It is also important to note that the null 
hypothesis for AR(2) must not be rejected. 
4. Results and discussions 
The result of the system GMM as presented in table 4.1 below indicates that the coefficient of free 
cash flow is 0.0393 suggesting that free cash flow has a positive impact on dividend pay-out of 
publicly quoted firms in Nigeria. The coefficient of free cash flow as shown in the table is statistically 
significant at a 5% level of significance.  This result suggests that a percentage increase in free cash 
flow will lead to about 0.04 per cent increase in dividend pay-out of quoted firms in Nigeria on 
average ceteris paribus. This finding fails to provide evidence to support the Jensen (1986), free cash 
flow hypothesis, which argued that managers of firms tend to invest in a project with negative Net 
Present Value (NPV) as the free cash flow within their control increases instead of distributing them 
as dividend to the shareholders.  The assertion that increases in free cash flow leads to unnecessary 
administrative waste and inefficiency resulting in a decrease in dividend pay-out could not be 
substantiated in this study. 
 
Table 4.1  The result of dynamic panel GMM  
VARIABLESVARI
ABLES 
Syst-GMM1 Syst-GMM2 Diff-GMM1 Diff-GMM2 
L.DIV 0.0515 0.0514 0.0738 0.0744 
 (0.0995) (0.0994) (0.121) (0.121) 
ASSETS 0.00895 0.00907 0.286** 0.287** 
 (0.0201) (0.0199) (0.135) (0.136) 
FCFE 0.0393**  0.048**  
 (0.0198)  (0.0231)  
OWC 0.0328**  0.0423**  
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 (0.0121)  (0.0132)  
FCFE_OWC  0.0460  0.0450 
  (0.0316)  (0.0442) 
Observations 650 650 570 570 
Number of crossed 65 65 65 65 
firm effect YES YES YES YES 
year effect NO NO NO NO 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
div = dividend pay-out as a ratio of total assets 
fcf = free cash flow to equity as a ratio of total assets 
at = natural logarithm of total assets 
owc = bulk ownership as a ratio of total outstanding shares 
bown = board interest as a ratio of total outstanding shares 
 
Our findings corroborate the result of Ojode (2014) who noted that firms with high free cash flow are 
likely to attract more investors who seek a return on their investment by way of dividend. This is so 
because most investors attach significant value on cash dividend.  The result also evidences the use of 
free cash flow by management to mitigate agency conflict as investors are paid cash dividend as free 
cash flow increases. Similarly, our findings indicate that possession of free cash flow does not 
increase agency costs as noted by Jensen (1986). Suggesting that, since the management of the firm 
tends to distribute the free cash flow available to them as dividends to the shareholders; the investors 
will not need to increase the cost of monitoring on the management that controls free cash flow. This 
finding is also in line with the result of Vakilifard and Shahmoradi (2014), who reported a strong 
relationship between free cash flow and return on equity of firms quoted in Iran stock exchange.  
 
The result further shows that when free cash flow interacts with ownership concentration, the effect 
on dividend pay-out remains positive indicating that the free cash flow hypothesis is not valid among 
firms quoted in the Nigerian stock exchange whether the share ownership is concentrated or not. 
Columns 3 and 4 present the result of differenced GMM which was performed as a robustness test. It 
also failed to provide empirical evidence to support the propositions of the free cash flow hypothesis, 
confirming the robustness of the result of the system GMM. 
 
 4.1 Result of the diagnostic test 
To ascertain whether or not the data are consistent with the assumptions of the Blundell and Bond 
(1998), Arellano and Bover (1995) estimator, we examined some of the commonly used diagnostic 
tests. In particular, the Sargan and Hansen tests statistic which examines the over-identification 
restrictions were reported. The two tests essentially examines whether the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error terms in the estimated equation. The test is based on the null hypothesis 
that the instruments as a group are exogenous. There is a need to find an exogenous instrument in 
other to validate the System-GMM estimates. 
 
Table 4.2 Result of the diagnostic test 
 Syst-GMM1 Syst-GMM2 Diff-GMM1 Diff-GMM2 
Hansen_test 4.116 4.111 4.190 4.108 
Hansen Prob 0.249 0.250 0.381 0.392 
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Sargan_test 6.018 6.043 3.370 3.374 
Sargan Prob 0.111 0.110 0.498 0.497 
AR(1)_test -2.297 -2.299 -2.112 -2.113 
AR(1)_P-value 0.0216 0.0215 0.0346 0.0346 
AR(2)_test 1.143 1.147 0.529 0.530 
AR(2)_P-value 0.253 0.251 0.597 0.596 
No. of Instruments 7 7 7 7 
 
The Sargan and Hansen tests statistic together with its associated p-values is reported in the dynamic 
panel regression tables 4.2. The Sargan test statistics for all models show a p-value greater than 0.10, 
hence we are unable to reject the null hypothesis. This result is corroborated with the result of the 
Hansen test with all p-values greater than 0.10 leading to the failure to reject the null hypothesis. This, 
however, suggests that the variables are not over-identified in line with the assumption of Arellano 
and Bond (1991) System-GMM estimator. The second test we report is the Arellano and Bond test for 
autocorrelation. The null hypothesis is 'no autocorrelation' and relates to the differenced residuals. The 
result of AR(1) with a probability of less than 0.05 for all the estimated models indicates the rejection 
of the null hypothesis suggesting that there is autocorrelation at AR(1). We only report the test 
statistics and its associated p-values for AR(2). For all the estimated models, we are unable to reject 
the null hypothesis of 'no autocorrelation' for AR(2). It implies that there is robust evidence that all 
models are free from autocorrelation at the 5% level.  
 
5. Conclusion 
The novelty provided by this study is that it is the first study to directly test the validity of the free 
cash flow hypothesis among firms quoted on the Nigerian stock exchange. The study employed a 
sample of 65 dividend-paying firms quoted on the Nigerian stock exchange within the period of 2007-
2017. The study provided empirical evidence that invalidates the propositions of the free cash flow 
hypothesis among publicly quoted firms in Nigeria. The result is robust using different estimation 
techniques. The interaction of free cash flow and ownership concentration affects dividend pay-out 
positive but statistically insignificant. This result implies that managers of a firm with free cash flow 
in Nigerian prefer distributing free cash flow to the shareholders as against investing it on projects 
with negative NPV. They chose this option because payment of the dividend is a signal that the firm is 
doing well which will result to increase in the market price of the firm's stock hence, increase the 
potential bonus accruable to the management of the firm. We, therefore, recommend that shareholders 
should not increase agency cost of monitoring firms with free cash flows in Nigeria as managers 
prefer to distribute free cash flow as a dividend instead of investing in projects with negative NPV. 
 
Limitation and study forward 
The study employed short panel data analysis techniques due to the unavailability of data for a longer 
period across the selected panel for the study. We equally focused on Jensen's free cash flow 
hypothesis across a sample of 65 countries quoted on the Nigerian stock exchange. Further studies can 
equally explore the validity of free cash flow on other stock exchanges in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
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Appendix 1 
7-Up Bottling 
Comp. Plc. 
Julius Berger 
Nig. Plc. 
Dangote Sugar 
Refinery Plc 
First Bank of 
Nigeria Holdings 
Plc 
Guinness Nig 
Plc 
A.G. Leventis 
Nigeria Plc.  
Aluminium 
Extrusion Ind. 
Plc.  
Royal Exchange 
Plc.  
First City 
Monument Bank 
Group Plc. 
 
Honeywell 
Flour Mill Plc 
Access Bank Plc. Berger Paints Plc  Diamond Bank Plc Fidelity Bank Plc Presco Plc  
John Holt Plc. Cadbury Nigeria 
Plc.  
Conoil Plc Ecobank 
Transnational 
Incorporated  
U A C N Plc.  
African Alliance 
Insurance 
Company Plc 
Roads Nig Plc.  Daar 
Communications 
Plc 
Evans Medical 
Plc.  
Flour Mills Nig. 
Plc.  
African Paints 
(Nigeria) Plc.  
Nestle Nigeria 
Plc.  
Dangote Cement 
Plc 
 
Universal 
Insurance 
Company Plc 
Forte Oil Plc.  
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Academy  Associated Bus 
Company  
Avon Crown caps 
& Containers 
B.O.C Gases Nig  Beta Glass 
Company  
Chellarams  Chemical & 
Allied Product  
Continental 
Reinsurance 
Cornerstone 
Insurance 
Custodian & 
Allied Insurance 
Lafarge Cement 
Wapco Nig  
GlaxoSmithKline 
Nig 
Ikeja Hotel  Learn Africa 
(Longman)  
May & Baker 
Nig  
Mobil Nig  Nascon Allied  National Aviation 
Handling  
Nem Insurance  Nigerian 
Enamelware  
Okomu Oil Palm  Total Nigeria  Transcorp Nig  University Press  Vitafoam Nig  
Updc Property Unilever Nig  Tripple Gee & 
Company  
Transcorp Nig  Sterling Bank  
Cutix  Oando  Nigerian Northen 
Flour Mill  
Nigerian 
Enamelware  
Mrs (Texaco 
Chevron) 
 
